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THE KILL SWITCH: THE NEW BATTLE OVER 
PRESIDENTIAL RECESS APPOINTMENTS 
Jeff VanDam 
ABSTRACT—Presidential recess appointments have strained relations 
between Congress and the Executive Branch since the Administration of 
George Washington. But in 2007, Congress began using a procedure to 
prevent such appointments from happening at all. By sending one member 
to stand in front of an empty chamber while the rest of the Senate took 
vacation, Congress claimed it was in “pro forma” session, not at recess, and 
that the President could therefore not make recess appointments. While 
Presidents Bush and Obama acquiesced to this tactic and declined to make 
appointments during such pro forma sessions, Obama changed course in 
early 2012. In so doing, this Comment argues, Obama’s appointments were 
on solid constitutional footing. Not only did the pro forma sessions 
deactivate an enumerated power of the President, but they did so by 
explicitly involving the House of Representatives in the appointments 
process, an event the Framers specifically sought to guard against. Indeed, 
by putting an end to recesses (and thus recess appointments), Congress 
defied a procedural assumption of the Framers written into the Constitution 
and practiced by legislatures for millennia. From a policy standpoint, 
blocking presidential appointments perpetuated a harmful glut of unfilled 
offices, but was in some cases self-defeating. The President, through the 
Appointments Act, has the power to fill certain positions with acting heads 
who carry out his policy goals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of January 23, 2012, just after most senators were 
returning from a month-long vacation away from Washington, Senator 
Chuck Grassley, a straight-talking seventy-eight-year-old farmer from 
Iowa, took the floor of the Senate with a blistering attack. The message: 
during the Senate’s holiday recess, President Barack Obama had 
orchestrated a power grab unprecedented in the annals of Congress.1 In 
making four recess appointments to executive branch positions earlier that 
month, Obama had become, Grassley said, nothing less than a king.2 He had 
shed constitutional limits on his powers, becoming the reviled monarch that 
the Constitution sought to replace.3 
These were serious charges, to be sure, but Grassley was not alone. 
Nearly the entire Republican cohort in the Senate vilified the President’s 
decision to “arrogantly cast[] aside our Constitution,” an action straight out 
 
1  158 CONG. REC. S24 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2012). 
2  Id. at S25. 
3  Id. Grassley went on to promise that the Office of Legal Counsel attorney who had written a 
memo defending the recess appointments would never again receive Senate confirmation; his hometown 
paper described the speech as an “explo[sion] [of] outrage.” Editorial, Grassley Personal Attack Went 
Too Far, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 31, 2012, at 6A. 
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of “the monarchies of Western Europe.”4 January 4, 2012, the day of the 
appointments, was a national disaster—“a day that will live on in infamy.”5 
Thirty-nine senators signed an open letter promising to serve as amici 
curiae to a pending legal claim against the appointments.6 And at a hearing 
with one of Obama’s recess picks, one senator actually stayed home in 
protest,7 while others assured the appointee that nothing he did in office 
would ever be upheld.8 
Angry senators have been a time-honored accompaniment to most 
presidents’ recess appointments, from George Washington to Theodore 
Roosevelt to George W. Bush. Presidents have used the power, set forth 
explicitly in Article II,9 to appoint federal officers ranging from army 
officers10 to Justices of the Supreme Court11 while the Senate is on vacation. 
Yet the anger that surrounded Obama’s own recess appointments in 2012 
reached a new level for one reason: this time, the Senate claimed it had 
never actually been at recess. 
Instead, during the chamber’s latest break, one senator briefly stood 
guard over the chamber once every three days—one time for forty-one 
seconds,12 another for twenty-nine seconds.13 In parliamentary terms, these 
legislators were keeping the Senate in “pro forma” session, thus preventing 
 
4  Seung Min Kim, Republicans Join Challenge of Recess Appointments, POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2012, 
1:37 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72422.html (quoting Sen. John Cornyn). 
5  Felicia Sonmez, Mike Lee on Obama Recess Appointments: A ‘Day of Infamy,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 
1, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/mike-lee-on-obama-recess-
appointments-a-day-of-infamy/2012/02/01/gIQAxozJiQ_blog.html (quoting Sen. Mike Lee). 
6  Open Letter from Thirty-Nine Members of the U.S. Senate (Feb. 3, 2012), available at http://
images.politico.com/global/2012/02/senate_gop_amicus_intent_letter_3_feb_12.pdf. 
7  See Peter Schroeder, Republican Lawmakers Begin Pushback Against Obama Recess 
Appointments, THE HILL (Jan. 29, 2012, 8:16 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/1007-other/
207277-republican-lawmakers-begin-pushback-against-obama-recess-appointments- (quoting Sen. 
Roger Wicker: “I will not provide the administration with the appearance of legitimacy in this action, 
and I will therefore not be in attendance at next Tuesday’s hearing.”). 
8  Jim Puzzanghera, GOP: Cordray’s Appointment Invalid, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, at B2 
(statement of Sen. Mike Johanns to Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Director Richard Cordray). 
9  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may 
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their 
next Session.”). 
10  See Special Session Is Merged Into Regular, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1903, at 1 [hereinafter Special 
Session] (detailing President Theodore Roosevelt’s recess appointment of 168 army officers during 
momentary recess of Congress). 
11  See Henry B. Hogue, The Law: Recess Appointments to Article III Courts, 34 PRESIDENTIAL 
STUD. Q. 656, 660–61 (2004) (describing recess appointments of twelve Supreme Court Justices). The 
practice of recess-appointing Supreme Court Justices was not limited to early America; Chief Justice 
Earl Warren and Justices William Brennan and Potter Stewart received their initial appointments from 
President Eisenhower during Senate recesses. See Diana Gribbon Motz, The Constitutionality and 
Advisability of Recess Appointments of Article III Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1677–78 (2011). 
12  158 CONG. REC. S1 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2012). 
13  Id. at S3 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2012). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 364 
the President from making any recess appointments whatsoever.14 While 
both George W. Bush and Obama had previously acquiesced to this tactic,15 
the Obama Administration in 2012 determined that the Senate was, in fact, 
bluffing.16 Obama’s four appointments included the director of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a new agency, as well as 
three members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which 
would not otherwise have been able to issue binding decisions.17 
Though it first appeared as a means of blocking appointments in 2007, 
the pro forma session—or, as at least one member of Congress called it 
publicly, the “kill switch”18—quickly became relied upon by both parties as 
a weapon against disfavored potential recess appointees.19 Yet Obama’s 
appointments in early 2012 changed that, and opponents of the move in 
legal circles have charged the President with abusing the separation of 
powers by deciding for himself whether the Senate was at recess.20 These 
opponents claim that parties who seek to challenge decisions of the 
agencies headed by recess appointees will likely find success in court.21 The 
reality, however, may not play out so cleanly. 
 
14  Id. at S24 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2012) (statement of Sen. Grassley: “[T]he Senate has been holding 
sessions every 3 days. It did so precisely to prevent the President from making recess appointments.”). 
15  See Charlie Savage, Obama Tempts Fight over Recess Appointments, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS (Jan. 
4, 2012, 4:34 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/obama-tempts-fight-over-recess-
appointments (positing that the 2012 appointments were “an unprecedented legal step that brought into 
sharper focus a recent bipartisan struggle over presidential power”). 
16  See Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic 
Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. (Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Lawfulness of Recess Appointments], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf. 
17  Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1 (late edition). For the Supreme Court’s decision that the NLRB must have 
three members to issue decisions, see New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2644 (2010). 
18  See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Jeff Landry, Landry Presides Over House, Blocks Recess 
Appointments (July 1, 2011), available at http://landry.house.gov/press-release/landry-presides-over-
house-blocks-recess-appointments (describing the “kill switch” as “a provision the Founding Fathers 
gave the House to utilize when the Senate’s advice and consent is being circumvented by a hostile 
Administration”). 
19  See Steven G. Bradbury & John P. Elwood, Recess Is Canceled: President Obama Should Call 
the Senate’s Bluff, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2010, at A19 (noting that pro forma sessions “will inevitably 
become the standard operating procedure, and the recess appointment power could become a virtual 
dead letter”). 
20  See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The Constitution Is Clear on Recess Appointments, RICOCHET (Jan. 4, 
2012, 3:52 PM), http://ricochet.com/main-feed/The-Constitution-Is-Clear-On-Recess-Appointments. 
21  See, e.g., John Yoo, Richard Cordray & the Use and Abuse of Executive Power, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE CORNER (Jan. 5, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/287264/richard-
cordray-use-and-abuse-executive-power-john-yoo. On the opposite end of the spectrum, proponents of 
the appointments have predicted their defense in court will be a “slam-dunk.” See, e.g., Laurence H. 
Tribe, Op-Ed., Games and Gimmicks in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, at A25. Others have 
opined that courts could go “either way.” See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, Obama’s Recess Appointments 
Might Not Hold Up in Court, THE HILL (Jan. 18, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/
administration/204731-recess-appointments-might-not-hold- (quoting Professor Charles Fried). 
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The recess appointments of 2012 may have occurred while the Senate 
had not formally declared a recess. But as this Comment will argue, they 
were nonetheless constitutional—and also prudent. As employed by the 
President, the recess appointments interrupted an unconstitutional 
congressional practice that appeared regularly since 2007. During that time, 
both the Senate and later the House employed the pro forma session in a 
manner that did not comport with the Framers’ intent or with modern policy 
realities that infuse the appointments process. Not only did the sessions 
nullify an enumerated power of the Executive, but they also involved the 
House in the appointments process, which is strictly the province of the 
President and Senate. Further, pro forma sessions essentially eliminated the 
recess, violating an assumption of the Framers who wrote recesses into the 
Constitution. 
Part I of this Comment will explore the historical antecedents of the 
recess of the American Congress and of the recess appointment power, as 
well as examine the evolution of both from procedural convenience to 
strategic weapon. In Part II, this Comment will examine arguments for and 
against the constitutionality of President Obama’s 2012 recess 
appointments, concluding that they were constitutionally valid. Part III will 
go further to examine whether the pro forma sessions intended to block 
those appointments were constitutional in their own right, concluding they 
were not. And in Part IV, this Comment will analyze policy implications of 
the pro forma session and of the President’s recess appointments, observing 
both the problem of crucial federal offices remaining unfilled and the 
negligible strategic effect that obstructionist pro forma sessions actually 
possess. 
These arguments seek to clarify a debate that has already sparked a 
vigorous back-and-forth in the legal community. But clarity on this question 
is also critical for its legal resolution. That this year’s recess appointments 
will be challenged is not in question; they already have been. In September 
2012, forty-two Republican senators made good on their promise to fight 
the appointments in court, filing an amicus brief in a canning company’s 
suit challenging the constitutionality of Obama’s recess appointments to the 
NLRB.22 Three months earlier, a Texas bank sued the CFPB itself, 
challenging the agency’s “unconstitutional formation and operation” due in 
part to Obama’s “refusing to secure the Senate’s advice and consent” in 
recess appointing the CFPB’s director.23 And in Washington, a district judge 
 
22  See Brief for Amici Curiae Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell and 41 Other Members 
of the United States Senate in Support of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Noel Canning, Noel Canning v. 
NLRB, Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 2012). Speaker of the House John Boehner filed an 
amicus brief of his own as well. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Speaker of the United States House of 
Representatives, John Boehner, in Support of Petitioner, Noel Canning v. NLRB, Nos. 12-1115, 12-
1153 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 2012). 
23  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3–4, State Natl’l Bank of Big Spring v. 
Geithner, No. 12-cv-01032, 2012 WL 2365284 (D.D.C. June 21, 2012). 
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in early 2012 dismissed a similar argument about the NLRB’s board 
members because the NLRB decision in question occurred “well before the 
recess appointments were announced.”24 
Given the status quo result of the November 2012 election—with 
President Obama returned to office, and the House and Senate retaining the 
same majorities—further skirmishes are possible. Each action of the CFPB 
under Richard Cordray and the NLRB with its new membership is subject 
to challenge by those affected. And as it was pointed out on the day of 
Obama’s reelection, Cordray’s recess appointment expires in 2013, 
portending another fight over an appointment for his position.25 A workable 
defense of the appointments on the merits will assist in deciding inevitable 
criticisms of the appointments in the coming years. 
I. THE RECESS AND THE RECESS APPOINTMENT 
A. Historical Antecedents 
The idea of legislative recess did not originate with the United States 
Congress. The Roman Senate typically took a recess starting in late spring, 
known as the senatus discessus. Only on these breaks, which were 
discussed by Cicero, “could a senator enjoy a connected holiday of any 
length.”26 While the houses of the English Parliament have always 
adjourned frequently, the decision to adjourn was sometimes not by choice, 
as the King often prorogued (or temporarily halted) parliamentary 
proceedings.27 Four hundred years ago, the houses of Parliament sought 
permission from the King to take their traditional recesses, and permission 
was not always given.28 But the practice of voluntary holiday breaks in 
 
24  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, Civ. Action No. 11-1629 (ABJ), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128436, 
at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2012). The decision has been appealed. Steve L. Hernández, Employer 
Associations Appeal District Court NLRB Posting Decision, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2b1ab9f9-cc5c-44d9-b1a0-1fde7034899a. 
25  See Kevin Wack, What Obama’s Victory Means for Banks, AM. BANKER (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:36 
PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_215/what-obama-s-victory-means-for-banks-105418
9-1.html?zkPrintable=true. As this Comment went to press, the first appellate arguments over the recess 
appointments were being held. In the Seventh Circuit, Judge Ann Claire Williams appeared skeptical of 
the Senate’s contention that it was not at recess. “Isn’t the Senate having its cake and eating it too?” she 
asked. Andrew Harris, Obama Recess Appointments Face First Appeals Court Test, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 
30, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-30/obama-recess-appointments-face-
first-appeals-court-test.html. 
26  JOHN H. D’ARMS, ROMANS ON THE BAY OF NAPLES: A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL STUDY OF THE 
VILLAS AND THEIR OWNERS FROM 150 B.C. TO A.D. 400, at 48–49 (1970). 
27  2 JOSEF REDLICH, THE PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 65–67 (A. Earnest Steinthal 
trans., 1903). 
28  On April 10, 1628, for example, the House of Commons asked King Charles I, “with his gracious 
Favour,” to grant an Easter recess; later that day, the King’s secretary reported that “his Majesty, for 
many weighty Reasons, desireth there may be no Recess.” 1 H.C. JOUR. 881 (Apr. 10, 1628), available 
at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=3704&strquery=recess. 
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Parliament was well established before the American Revolution. In 1770, 
for example, the House of Lords voted to adjourn on December 21, and 
returned to London in time to hold sessions during the last few days of 
January the following year.29 
In America, the Continental Congress broke frequently as it moved 
around the country during the lead-in to the Revolutionary War, staying 
ahead of potential danger surrounding its activities.30 The body took few 
long recesses, perhaps owing to the urgency of its task managing the new 
country and its war, but after the completion of hostilities, it did manage to 
take a holiday vacation.31 After 1789, recesses were more frequent and 
lasted much longer.32 The state legislatures took generous breaks as well. In 
December 1778, its work complete for the year, the Virginia House of 
Delegates took a recess of over four months; members were instructed to 
meet with their constituents during the break and gain their approval for a 
pay raise.33 In Colonial Era Massachusetts, the House of Representatives 
held three sessions each year, with breaks of a few months between each.34 
Just as Congress did not come up with the idea of taking pronounced 
legislative breaks, it also did not originate the practice of tapping an actor to 
execute its duties while members are away. In England, the House of 
Commons was permitted to grant large sums for the King’s use during an 
upcoming recess if the House feared that war would break out at that time.35 
Likewise, as Blackstone noted, if the House of Lords was away at recess 
and could not perform its duty as a supreme court of appeal, a tribunal of 
nobles, appointed with every new Parliament, was empowered to serve in 
its place.36 Finally, if Parliament was in recess “upwards of twenty days” 
when a vacancy occurred among its members, the Speaker of the House of 
 
29  33 H.L. JOUR. 35–37 (Dec. 21, 1770). 
30  8 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 754–55 (Worthington Chauncey 
Ford ed., 1907) (entry for Sept. 18, 1777, referring to a letter from a Revolutionary Army colonel that 
“intimated the necessity of Congress removing immediately from Philadelphia”; the body met again 
nine days later in Lancaster, Pennsylvania). 
31  27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 710 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1928) 
(adjourning on Dec. 24, 1784, for eighteen days); 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–
1789, at 1 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933) (resuming business on Jan. 11, 1785). 
32  See infra Part I.B. 
33  See 1778 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 123, 
129 (Richmond, Thomas W. White 1827). 
34  See, e.g., JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1721–1722 
(1922); JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1764–1765 (1971). 
35  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 209 n.32 (Thomas M. 
Cooley ed., Chi., Callaghan & Cockcroft 1871) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE (Cooley ed.)]. 
36  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *56–57. The tribunal comprised one prelate, two 
earls, and two barons. Id. at *57. 
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Commons was directed by statute to make arrangements for a special 
election.37 
The theme continued in the Colonies. When members of the 
Continental Congress traveled during the Revolutionary War, they assigned 
General George Washington “full power” to execute combat operations.38 
Similarly, the Articles of Confederation made provisions for what was to 
occur when Congress was at recess and could not perform its duties. The 
Articles called for a “Committee of the States,”39 which could, during a 
recess, execute “such of the powers of Congress as the United States in 
Congress assembled, by the consent of nine States, shall from time to time 
think expedient to vest them with.”40 The committee was the brainchild of 
Thomas Jefferson, who saw the need for a body “during vacations of 
Congress” that could “superintend the executive business.”41 Yet Jefferson 
watched the committee crumble; he wrote in his autobiography that its 
members “quarrelled very soon, split into two parties, abandoned their post, 
and left the government without any visible head, until the next meeting in 
Congress.”42 Still, the outcome was not all bad; it helped convince Jefferson 
that a unitary executive, or a “single Arbiter,” was necessary for effective 
government.43 
B. The Recess Appointment in History 
1. Founding Principles.—Despite their antecedents in British and 
American history, recess appointments received little mention during the 
Founding Era. After the regular Appointments Clause44 was adopted during 
the Convention of 1787, an action that engendered some debate,45 a North 
Carolinian named Richard Dobbs Spaight made a motion to adopt the 
 
37  1 BLACKSTONE (Cooley ed.), supra note 35, at 115 n.40. The Speaker could also issue a writ for a 
new election during a recess of any fellow member who had been declared bankrupt. Id. at 116 n.41. 
38  6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 30, at 1027 (1906) (declaration of Dec. 
12, 1776). 
39  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 5 (“The United States in Congress 
assembled shall have authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of Congress . . . .”). 
40  Id. art. X. 
41  THOMAS JEFFERSON, The Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 7, 53–54 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 2004). 
42  Id. at 54. 
43  Id. 
44  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . .”). 
45  See JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 680–81 (photo. reprint 2003) 
(E.H. Scott ed., Chi., Scott, Foresman & Co. spec. ed. 1898) (debate of Sept. 7, 1787). George Wilson, 
for example, wanted to exclude the legislature altogether from the appointments process; Charles 
Pinckney argued that the Senate should be involved only in appointing ambassadors, in which the 
President should have no say at all. Id. 
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language of the Recess Appointments Clause as it stands today.46 The 
language was accepted unanimously and apparently without debate.47 The 
Clause’s language closely followed that of the North Carolina constitution,48 
and the reasoning for accepting it was not discussed. One explanation, 
provided by Justice Story, was that the Framers’ decision to allow recess 
appointments was “so obvious that it can require no elucidation,” because 
without them, “the Senate should be perpetually in session, in order to 
provide for the appointment of officers.”49 That option “would have been at 
once burdensome to the Senate and expensive to the public,” and so recess 
appointments were permitted in the pursuit of “convenience, promptitude of 
action, and general security.”50 
Justice Story’s point makes sense, because in the beginning, the recess 
of the Senate was long—sometimes longer than the actual session itself. 
Even before the Senate first convened, the Framers were likely aware of the 
hardship of travel to Washington from most states. Therefore, as Hamilton 
observed, “it would have been improper to oblige this body to be 
continually in session for the appointment of officers.”51 While the Senate’s 
first recess, in 1789, was just over three months,52 subsequent recesses in 
the next several sessions of Congress ranged from four months53 to nine.54 
In fact, prior to the twentieth century, the Senate averaged fewer than 
six months of active duty each year.55 The prospect of leaving open vital 
executive offices, such as that of Secretary of War, was considered 
potentially dangerous, just as reconvening the Senate whenever an 
appointment was necessary would be costly.56 During all other times, the 
President could “appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States” 
only with the “Advice and Consent of the Senate.”57 Thus, even though 
 
46  Id. at 681–82. 
47  Id. 
48  Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical 
Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758, 1770–72 & n.71 (1984). 
49  2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1557, at 380 
(photo. reprint 1994) (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Bos., Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1891). 
50  Id. 
51  THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
52  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 94 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
53  Id. at 1036 (1790) (noting adjournment of Congress from August to December). 
54  3 ANNALS OF CONG. 668 (1793) (noting adjournment sine die on March 4, 1793); 4 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 9 (1793) (noting commencement of new session of Senate on Dec. 2, 1793). 
55  HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33310, RECESS 
APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, JANUARY 20, 2001–OCTOBER 31, 2008, at 5 
(2008). 
56  See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA 
L. REV. 1487, 1498–99 (2005). 
57  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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practically nothing was said when the Convention adopted the Recess 
Appointments Clause, evidence suggests that it was intended to allow the 
President to act unilaterally on appointments when the Senate was unable to 
advise and consent. 
This intention was tested immediately, as George Washington made 
the first recess appointments during the three-month break between the first 
and second sessions of Congress.58 Certain officers that President 
Washington had nominated (and that the Senate had confirmed) declined to 
serve.59 When the Senate returned, Washington wrote its members a polite 
letter informing them that, “agreeably to the Constitution,” he had 
appointed four individuals to fill those spots during the recess: three district 
judges, and also a replacement for John Marshall, who had turned down the 
job of U.S. Attorney for Virginia.60 Washington’s successors continued the 
practice. John Adams, for example, made 21 recess appointments between 
the Fifth and Sixth Congresses.61 Just over 2 years later, Thomas Jefferson 
managed to appoint 120 officers during a single Senate recess, including 30 
judges in the newly created courts for the District of Columbia and 
replacements for others who had died, resigned, declined, or been 
promoted.62 
Not all of these appointments were without controversy. President 
Washington was the first to find that failure to involve the Senate in the 
appointment of a major government officer comes with drawbacks. During 
a recess in 1795, Washington appointed John Rutledge to be Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court.63 Yet in a rare rebuff to a president of “transcendent 
status,”64 the Senate refused to confirm Rutledge during its next session, 
requiring him to leave office.65 The reason, it seemed, was political, as 
Rutledge had made a speech against the Jay Treaty with the British.66 The 
conflict was a portent, albeit a small one, of the prolonged battle over recess 
appointments to come. 
2. Modern Warfare.—The modern conception of the recess 
appointment as an alternative to advice and consent may have originated 
with Theodore Roosevelt.67 In December 1903, Roosevelt needed a way to 
 
58  See JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 38 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1820) 
(proceedings of Feb. 9, 1790). 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. at 325–26 (proceedings of Dec. 5, 1799). 
62  Id. at 400–04 (proceedings of Jan. 6, 1802). 
63  Curtis, supra note 48, at 1775–76. 
64  JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON 147 (2004). 
65  Motz, supra note 11, at 1671. 
66  Id. 
67  The Senate does, however, have a history of rejecting recipients of presidential recess 
appointments who are then nominated for confirmation through normal means. See generally Louis C. 
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reappoint Dr. William D. Crum, an African-American, as Collector of 
Customs in Charleston, South Carolina.68 Roosevelt and his Secretary of 
War, Elihu Root, did not want to face the wrath of Southern Democrats who 
opposed Crum’s tenure—particularly South Carolina Senator Benjamin R. 
“Pitchfork Ben” Tillman.69 So Roosevelt and Root decided upon a recess 
appointment as the way to keep Crum in office.70 There was only one 
problem: the Senate planned to start its new session immediately after the 
end of the previous one.71 Ingeniously, Roosevelt announced that his recess 
appointment of Crum, along with 167 other officers, would occur during the 
split second between the two Senate sessions—an infinitesimal period that 
Root and Roosevelt termed a “constructive” recess.”72 
The Senate was not happy.73 In 1905, the Judiciary Committee issued a 
report arguing that “[t]here was no ‘recess’ within the letter or spirit of the 
Constitution, and therefore there was no right to issue commissions . . . . 
The theory of ‘constructive recess’ constitutes a heavy draft upon the 
imagination.”74 It should be noted that the President’s “constructive” recess 
appointments nonetheless stood, despite the controversy.75 
Modern presidents have continued to appoint officers of the federal 
government during congressional recesses for reasons more like 
 
James, Senatorial Rejections of Presidential Nominations to the Cabinet: A Study in Constitutional 
Custom, 3 ARIZ. L. REV. 232 (1961) (outlining such senatorial rejections). 
68  EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 198, 301 (2001). Earlier in his term, Roosevelt had chosen 
Crum to replace a white man as Collector of Customs in Charleston. 
69  Willard B. Gatewood, Theodore Roosevelt and Southern Republicans: The Case of South 
Carolina, 1901–1904, 70 S.C. HIST. MAG. 251, 263 (1969) (reporting that Roosevelt’s failure to back 
Crum “would appear too much like a surrender to the blatant racism of his enemy Tillman”). Roosevelt 
had roused considerable Southern anger with the appointment of Crum; in particular, Senator Tillman 
“threatened social violence” if the Senate overrode his committee’s negative report on the appointment, 
musing that “[w]e still have guns and ropes in the South.” MORRIS, supra note 68, at 210. 
70  MORRIS, supra note 68, at 301. 
71  VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33009, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: A LEGAL 
OVERVIEW 8 (2011). Roosevelt had called Congress into special session the month before to acquire 
approval for his Cuban reciprocity treaty. See MORRIS, supra note 68, at 272. Showing their disfavor for 
Roosevelt and displaying their power, House leaders dragged on the session until the very moment 
before the scheduled start of the regular session, despite having already passed the treaty. Id. at 299. 
72  Special Session, supra note 10 (“The conclusion has been reached that between the time of the 
falling of President pro tempore Frye’s gavel signifying the conclusion of the extraordinary session and 
the calling to order of the Senate in the regular session of Congress, an appreciable lapse of time 
occurred.”). 
73  See Fight on Crum Renewed: Senators Attack President’s “Constructive Recess” Policy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1904, at 3 (detailing the Senate debate over Dr. Crum’s appointment, including charges 
that Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Treasury, Leslie M. Shaw, was “guilty of malfeasance in office” and 
thus indictable for installing Crum). 
74  S. REP. NO. 58-4389, at 3 (1905). 
75  Gatewood, supra note 69, at 262–64 (noting that the Senate finally confirmed Dr. Crum for the 
office he had held for over two years in 1905; Roosevelt had to use the recess appointment several times 
in the absence of confirmation). 
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Roosevelt’s than Jefferson’s. In announcing a round of recess appointments 
in 2010, Barack Obama blamed the Senate’s pursuit of “scoring political 
points” in blocking his nominees, adding, “I simply cannot allow partisan 
politics to stand in the way of the basic functioning of government.”76 
George W. Bush expressed similar sentiments when he appointed John R. 
Bolton ambassador to the United Nations during a Senate recess in 2005, 
calling the position “too important to leave vacant any longer, especially 
during a war and a vital debate about U.N. reform.”77 In other words, 
presidents today still see the recess appointment power as necessary—but 
the aggravating factor now is the intransigence of the Senate, not the long 
trip to and from the Capitol. 
Though the rationale for recess appointments has changed drastically 
between the era of Washington and Jefferson and that of Bush and Obama, 
the power still stands as an accepted use of presidential power. During a 
recent oral argument at the Supreme Court, the conversation turned to the 
Senate’s failure to reach a vote on certain presidential nominees.78 When the 
Acting Solicitor General, Neal Katyal, complained that the regular advice 
and consent process had been too contentious, Chief Justice John Roberts 
seemed incredulous. “And the recess appointment power doesn’t work—
why?” Roberts asked,79 wondering aloud at the government’s failure to 
implement the obvious solution to evade a stubborn Senate. 
Roosevelt’s stratagem of using a recess appointment to install a 
nominee who is particularly unfavorable to the Senate has become more or 
less standard practice,80 so much so that scholars once predicted that 
Congress could not or would not overcome it.81 In terms of numbers, recess 
appointments are relatively infrequent, yet frequent enough to draw 
scrutiny. One recent study found that 12% of presidential appointments to 
independent agencies occurred during recesses of the Senate; such 
appointments were far more likely when the President was popular and 
 
76  Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Key 
Administration Positions (Mar. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-positions. 
77  Elisabeth Bumiller & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, President Sends Bolton to U.N.; Bypasses Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005, at A1 (late edition). 
78  Transcript of Oral Argument at 49–50, New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010) 
(No. 08-1457). The case considered whether the NLRB could issue binding decisions with fewer than 
three members. New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2638. 
79  Oral Argument at 51:48, New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (No. 08-1457), available at http://
www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2009/2009_08_1457. 
80  See Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on Senate Confirmations (Feb. 
11, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-senate-
confirmations; see also infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text (discussing the recess appointments 
of George W. Bush). 
81  See Michael Herz, Abandoning Recess Appointments?: A Comment on Hartnett (and Others), 
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 443, 460 (2005) (arguing that congressional adoption of an innovative legislative 
means to overcome recess appointments was highly unlikely and noting “these things never happen”). 
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lacked partisan support in the Senate.82 Their use has accordingly varied 
widely with each administration, though counts are not exact83: 
TABLE 1: RECESS APPOINTMENTS FROM FDR TO OBAMA 
President Number of recess 
appointments84 
Franklin D. Roosevelt   89 
Harry S. Truman 195 
Dwight D. Eisenhower 193 
John F. Kennedy   53 
Lyndon B. Johnson   36 
Richard M. Nixon   41 
Gerald R. Ford   12 
James E. Carter   68 
Ronald W. Reagan 243 
George H.W. Bush   77 
William J. Clinton 139 
George W. Bush 171 
Barack H. Obama85   28 
 
As is evident from the chart above, President Reagan was the most 
prolific recess appointer in recorded American history, “shap[ing] executive 
agencies in ways that would have been difficult, if not impossible” had 
Reagan followed the typical nominations process.86 Such actions often drew 
harsh responses. In the controversy over Reagan’s nomination of Judge 
Robert Bork to the Supreme Court in October 1987, Senate Majority Leader 
 
82  Pamela C. Corley, Avoiding Advice and Consent: Recess Appointments and Presidential Power, 
36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 670, 676–78 (2006) (counting appointments between 1945 and 2000). As 
Corley posits, the President is a “rational political actor”; recess appointments are easiest to make in a 
political sense when the President has enough popularity to sell the appointments to the public. Id. at 
672, 678. In other words, “it appears that presidents use this power sparingly and strategically, when 
they think they can get away with it.” Id. at 678. 
83  See Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess 
Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2209 n.31 (1994) (noting the difficulties of compiling a 
complete list of recess appointments, especially before 1965 when they were “recorded in a haphazard 
fashion” (quoting Memorandum from Rogelio Garcia, Government Division, Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Mar. 13, 
1985))). 
84  All figures except that of the Obama administration come from Total Recess Appointments, by 
President, 1933–2010, U.S. SENATE (July 6, 2010), http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
resources/pdf/TotalRecessAppointments1933-present.pdf. 
85  Kara Rowland, Two Nominees Again Face Senate, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2011, at A4 (“Mr. 
Obama has made 28 recess appointments so far.”). 
86  Carrier, supra note 83, at 2215. 
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Robert Byrd warned that he would hold pro forma sessions to keep the 
Congress in session for the rest of the year if Reagan tried to recess appoint 
a Supreme Court Justice.87 Instead, Reagan proceeded to nominate Bork 
through regular means, and the full Senate rejected his nomination.88 While 
Senator Byrd never had to make good on his threat, his successors in the 
Senate—and then the House—would do so with great effect two decades 
later. 
C. Evolution of the Pro Forma Session 
1. Early Use.—For much of the lifespan of Congress, the pro forma 
session, in the words of former Speaker of the House Jim Wright, “never 
hurt anybody.”89 Its use was routine and procedural. Members of one house 
of Congress would hold such a session when, for whatever reason, it did not 
reach a joint agreement to adjourn with their counterparts. The practice is 
required, or at least inspired, by a clause in Article I (the “Adjournments 
Clause”) that forbids either house of Congress to adjourn for over three 
days “without the Consent of the other.”90 
For example, if the House passed an adjournment resolution before one 
of Congress’s typical vacation periods but the Senate did not, then the two 
bodies did not agree on the recess. As a result, the House would be obliged 
to meet in pro forma session every three days during the vacation to satisfy 
the Adjournments Clause.91 Such meetings were not extraordinary; Senator 
Byrd characterized them as “just coming in, going out—because otherwise 
we could not recess for 3 days without the approval of the other body.”92 
The only other clause of the Constitution addressing the situation of 
disagreement between the houses on adjournment allows the President to 
“adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper.”93 However, no 
president has ever invoked that authority, though they have often used the 
procedural power granted by Article II to, “on extraordinary Occasions, 
convene both Houses, or either of them.”94 
 
87  See John Hanrahan, Washington News, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Oct. 7, 1987 (available at 
LexisNexis) (describing Senate’s threat to hold pro forma sessions “for the remainder of the year” if 
Reagan nominated a Supreme Court Justice during congressional recess). 
88  Edward Walsh & Ruth Marcus, Bork Rejected for High Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1987, at 
A1. 
89  124 CONG. REC. 7047 (1978) (statement of Rep. Jim Wright). 
90  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. 
91  See, e.g., 112 CONG. REC. 7843 (1966) (statement of Sen. Mike Mansfield) (describing 
concurrent adjournment resolution to be passed alongside the House before Easter recess, without which 
“it would be necessary for the House to meet every 3 days as prescribed in the Constitution”). 
92  123 CONG. REC. 33,302 (1977). 
93  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
94  Id.; THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
563 (Johnny H. Killian et al. eds., 2004). 
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For some members of Congress, the promise of holding a pro forma 
session in place of the next day’s regular session was a “carrot,”95 or an 
incentive to quickly finish the day’s work so that most members could leave 
town. Just one unlucky member of the house in question would stay behind 
to conduct the pro forma session. The member’s punishment was not 
severe; the sessions were often less than a minute, and sometimes so brief 
as to be instantaneous.96 Sessions on Mondays and Fridays were often pro 
forma, “without roll-call votes,” so that members’ “weekend fence-building 
trips back home could be extended.”97 
On occasion, however, pro forma sessions arose during conflict 
between the two houses. In 1977, the House considered rejecting the 
Senate’s recess resolution and holding pro forma sessions instead of 
adjourning in order to protest the Senate’s decision to go on break without 
addressing certain legislation, which left House members “dangling on the 
vine.”98 In general, however, pro forma sessions occurred not out of spite, 
but out of necessity, as one house for whatever reason was not able to 
adjourn at the same time as the other. 
2. Transformation Into Political Weapon.—Throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, senators continued to hold pro forma sessions for procedural 
reasons only. They did not use them to block recess appointments during 
that time, despite threats to do so.99 However, rumblings about pro forma 
sessions ratcheted up during the tenure of George W. Bush100 and escalated 
in 2004 after he recess appointed two federal circuit court judges.101 The 
appointment of one of those judges, William Pryor of the Eleventh Circuit, 
prompted a motion in a lawsuit before that court to disqualify Judge Pryor 
from hearing the case. The litigant claimed that the judge’s recess 
 
95  111 CONG. REC. 22,640 (1965) (statement of Sen. Wayne Morse) (“I have some good hopes that 
we might be able to finish that bill this afternoon, and, if we can finish it this afternoon, it is my 
understanding that any session that we have tomorrow will be only a pro forma session and that the 
Senate will adjourn until Tuesday. That would be called a ‘carrot.’”). 
96  See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 37,532 (1977) (recording a six-second session of the Senate gaveled in 
and out by Sen. Lee Metcalf). 
97  ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 388 (2002). 
98  117 CONG. REC. 16,833 (1971) (statement of Rep. Durward G. Hall). 
99  See, e.g., Marc Lacey, Gay Activist Named Envoy over Objections, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 1999, at 
A1 (describing senators’ anger over President Clinton’s appointment of a gay man as ambassador to 
Luxembourg and threats to block subsequent recess appointments with pro forma sessions). 
100  Bush’s recess appointment of Eugene Scalia in particular set off Senate alarm bells. Paul Kane, 
Senate Set for Recess Politics, ROLL CALL, Dec. 13, 2001 (available at LexisNexis) (reporting that 
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle had “floated the idea that the Senate would not adjourn for recess 
at all”). 
101  See Paul Kane, Daschle: Recess in Peril; Judicial Appointments Again Scramble Schedule, 
ROLL CALL (Feb. 25, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/49_82/-4489-1.html (reporting 
Daschle’s anger over the recess appointments of Charles Pickering to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
and William Pryor to the Eleventh Circuit). 
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appointment was invalid.102 And before the summer recess of 2007, Senate 
Democrats came close to activating pro forma sessions in response to 
President Bush’s recess appointment of Sam Fox, financial backer of a 
group that criticized 2004 Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry, as 
ambassador to Belgium.103 
It was not until the Thanksgiving recess of 2007 that senators finally 
followed through with threats to use the pro forma session to prevent all 
recess appointments by President Bush.104 Angry over the breakdown of a 
deal with Bush, as well as the possibility of a recess appointment of a 
Surgeon General who had made potentially dubious health claims,105 Senate 
Majority Leader Harry Reid scheduled two weeks of pro forma sessions 
during the recess.106 Senate Democrats again used the tactic over the holiday 
recess into 2008,107 and in February,108 May,109 August,110 October through 
 
102  See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The motion failed; in one of 
the few judicial pronouncements on the subject, the en banc court held that Pryor’s appointment was 
valid based on the history and text of the Recess Appointments Clause. Id. at 1222–27. 
103  Erin P. Billings, Democrats May Block Nominees, ROLL CALL (Apr. 11, 2007, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/52_106/-17925-1.html. The two sides reached a deal instead, in which 
Bush agreed not to make recess appointments if Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid allowed some of 
Bush’s nominees to reach a vote. Al Kamen, Don’t Make Me Use Article I, Section 5!, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 17, 2007, at A15. 
104  The associate historian of the United States Senate, Donald A. Ritchie, said in late 2007 that the 
Democrats’ use of pro forma sessions at that time was the first instance of the body doing so “for the 
express purpose of blocking appointments.” Peter Baker, During Recess, Democrats Push Back, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 24, 2007, at A13. 
105  Sean Lengell, Senate Democrats Play Recess Hardball, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, at A1 
(reporting accusations that Bush’s candidate had made erroneous claims about homosexual sex). 
106  Paul Kane, Senate Stays in Session to Block Recess Appointments, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2007, 
at A4 (reporting Reid’s anger with Bush’s failure to nominate “Democratic selections for . . . bipartisan 
commissions”). 
107  See Gail Russell Chaddock, Watchdog Panel Sidelined as Elections Roll, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Jan. 9, 2008, at 1. 
108  See Neil H. Simon, Virginians at the Capitol, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 2008, at 
A7. 
109  See Jim Abrams, Quick Senate Session Blocks Bush Appointees, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 
24, 2008, at 8A. 
110  See Sean Lengell, Senate Democrats Seek to Block Bush, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A6. 
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December of 2008,111 and in January 2009.112 During these periods, Bush 
chose not to make a single recess appointment.113 
For some time after, the pro forma session again went dormant, 
perhaps because the Democrats who had initially used it were now of the 
same party as the President. President Obama made recess appointments 
without incident on four separate occasions in 2010.114 But later that year, 
Senate Democrats brought the pro forma session back. They struck a deal 
with Republicans to hold pro forma sessions through the November 
elections if the Republicans agreed not to send Obama’s nominations back 
to the White House.115 
A few months later, the House got involved. Fearing that President 
Obama would recess appoint Elizabeth Warren to head the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau,116 House Republican leaders threatened, at the 
urging of Senate Republicans,117 not to send an adjournment resolution to 
the Senate, forcing Harry Reid to schedule more pro forma sessions.118 
 
111  See Kelsey Lamb & Michael Lepage, The Week in Review, CONGRESSNOW, Nov. 21, 2008 
(available at LexisNexis) (reporting pro forma sessions through Dec. 8 “to prevent President George W. 
Bush from making recess appointments”); Kelsey Lamb & Michael Lepage, Two Weeks in Review, 
CONGRESSNOW, Oct. 3, 2008 (available at LexisNexis) (reporting pro forma sessions through 
November 17). 
112  See Greg Hitt et al., Rescue Bid for Detroit Collapses in Senate, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at 
A1 (reporting that Senate would be in pro forma session “until January, when the new Congress will be 
convened with stronger Democratic majorities”). 
113  HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42329, RECESS 
APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA 3 (2012) (indicating Bush made no recess 
appointments after the seventh year of his presidency). 
114  See Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Key 
Administration Posts (Dec. 29, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/
29/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-posts; Press Release, The 
White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Key Administration Posts (Aug. 19, 
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/19/president-obama-
announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-posts; Press Release, The White House, President 
Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Key Administration Positions (July 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-
administration-positions-0; Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess 
Appointments to Key Administration Positions (Mar. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-positions. 
115  See David M. Herszenhorn, A Rush to Legislate, and to Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2010, at 
A16. 
116  Warren was, to say the least, disliked by Republican House members as a potential leader of the 
bureau. See Ylan Q. Mui, GOP Senators Vow to Block CFPB Chief, WASH. POST, May 6, 2011, at A20. 
117  See Jonathan Allen, Senators Ask John Boehner to Help Block Obama Recess Appointments, 
POLITICO (May 25, 2011, 7:15 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/55723.html (detailing 
senators’ request to House Republican leadership for help on blocking recess appointments). 
118  Kathleen Hunter, Senate Republicans Block Prospect of Warren’s Consumer Board 
Appointment, BLOOMBERG (May 26, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-27/
senate-republicans-block-prospect-of-warren-s-consumer-board-appointment.html. The move brought 
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Following that episode, several members of the House decided they would 
cut out the middleman and simply hold pro forma sessions themselves, 
pushing the Senate to do the same.119 Throughout the summer of 2011, these 
congressmen gaveled in pro forma House sessions every three days;120 in 
response, Obama made no recess appointments. 
That is, until January 2012. Despite continuing pro forma sessions that 
had been the norm during Senate breaks since 2007, President Obama made 
four recess appointments on January 4.121 The appointments did not occur 
on a day when the Senate was in pro forma session; one such session was 
held the day before, on January 3,122 and the next happened on January 6.123 
The Administration released as support for its decision a memorandum by 
the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, which opined that 
because the Senate had not been conducting business during its pro forma 
sessions, it was effectively at recess for over a month.124 
The outcry was immediate. The Speaker of the House, John Boehner, 
said the appointments represented “an extraordinary and entirely 
unprecedented power grab.”125 Mitch McConnell, the Senate Majority 
Leader, said Obama had “threaten[ed] the confirmation process and 
fundamentally endanger[ed] the Congress’s role in providing a check on the 
excesses of the executive branch.”126 And one member of the House, Bill 
Johnson of Ohio, threatened to sue Obama himself over the appointments.127 
Was it possible the President had overstepped his authority? 
 
on the odd sight of Democratic senators holding pro forma sessions, which had the effect of blocking the 
nominees of the President of their own party. 
119  Peter Schroeder, GOP Freshmen: Stop Recess Appointments by Stopping Recess, THE HILL, 
June 14, 2011, at 6. 
120  Stephen Dinan, GOP Prevents Recess Appointments, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2011, at A3 
(reporting that House members were “holding regular sessions throughout the summer so that the Senate 
also must remain in session”). 
121  Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Key 
Administration Posts (Jan. 4, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/
04/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-posts. 
122  158 CONG. REC. S1 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2012). 
123  Id. at S3 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2012). 
124  See Lawfulness of Recess Appointments, supra note 16, at 3–4. 
125  Brad Plumer, With Cordray Appointment, Obama Sets New Precedent, WASH. POST WONKBLOG 
(Jan. 4, 2012, 11:22 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/with-cordray-
appointment-obama-to-set-precedent/2012/01/04/gIQAJvMYaP_blog.html. 
126  David Nakamura & Felicia Sonmez, Obama Defies Senate, Puts Cordray in Consumer Post, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1. 
127  David DeWitt, GOP Rep Threatens to Sue Obama over Recess Appointment, ATHENS NEWS, 
Jan. 17, 2012, at 13. Still unclear is what standing Representative Johnson would have had in such a 
lawsuit. 
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II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OBAMA’S 2012 RECESS APPOINTMENTS 
When the dust settled and the legal academic community began to 
debate the 2012 recess appointments, arguments centered on a few key 
issues. The primary contention of those opposing the appointments was that 
the President had taken it upon himself to decide when the Senate was at 
recess, removing from the Legislative Branch the ability to make its own 
rules.128 “Here, it is for the Congress to decide how to operate and govern 
itself, not the president,” wrote Professor John Yoo. “If the Senate wants to 
have a session where nothing happens—which, I might argue, is best for the 
country in many cases—that is its prerogative.”129 
Another argument held that the Senate did in fact do substantive work 
between the time it recessed on December 17 and when it resumed work on 
January 23.130 Senator Harry Reid, standing in a chamber with one other 
senator, had asked for and received unanimous consent on the payroll tax 
cut on December 23 during a supposedly pro forma session.131 Finally, 
opponents argued that because the House had not ever consented to an 
adjournment of more than three days, the Senate could not technically 
recess without violating the Adjournments Clause132 of Article I.133 
A. Realities on the Ground 
As a general response to the above arguments, it is first important to 
note one objective fact: the Senate was not in any kind of session, pro forma 
or otherwise, on the day the President made his recess appointments. No 
meeting of the Senate took place between January 3 and January 6;134 the 
January 4 appointments, therefore, occurred during a three-day recess at the 
 
128  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings . . . .”). 
129  John Yoo, Cordray’s Tribe, NAT’L REV. ONLINE CORNER (Jan. 6, 2012, 5:42 PM), http://www.
nationalreview.com/corner/287439/cordrays-tribe-john-yoo. 
130  See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Op-Ed., Democrats and Executive Overreach, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
10, 2012, at A13 (“[T]hese sessions are not, in fact, a sham—the Senate enacted the payroll tax holiday 
extension, President Obama’s leading legislative priority, on Dec. 23 during one of those pro forma 
sessions . . . .”). 
131  157 CONG. REC. S8789–90 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2011). Reid was able to use this unusual 
maneuver to pass legislation because the Republican congressional leadership had agreed to it the day 
before. See Pete Kasperowicz, Congress Approves Payroll Tax Bill, THE HILL (Dec. 23, 2011, 11:06 
AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/201157-house-quickly-approves-payroll-tax-bill. 
132  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the 
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two 
Houses shall be sitting.”). 
133  Edwin Meese III & Todd Gaziano, Op-Ed., Obama’s Abuse of Power, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 
2012, at A17 (arguing that the appointments violated “the duty of comity that the executive owes to 
Congress”). 
134  158 CONG. REC. S1 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2012) (“Under the previous order, the Senate stands 
adjourned until 11 a.m. on Friday, January 6, 2012.”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 380 
least. They were appointments made when no Senator was around to vote 
on them, not during a Senate lunch break or under cover of night. 
And the recess, in reality, was much longer than three days. When the 
Senate broke for vacation on December 17, 2011, its members unanimously 
consented that there would be “no business conducted” until January 23, 
2012.135 Standing alone, such a declaration meets the Senate’s only 
officially promulgated definition of recess. In the fury over Theodore 
Roosevelt’s “constructive recess” of 1903, the Senate sought to define the 
term so there would be no further confusion.136 A recess of the Senate 
occurs, the Senate said, “when its members owe no duty of attendance; 
when its Chamber is empty; when, because of its absence, it cannot receive 
communications from the President or participate as a body in making 
appointments.”137 This definition has been formally included in the Senate 
Parliamentarian’s manual of procedure.138 Those requirements were all met 
during the pro forma sessions of 2011 and 2012; no senator was required to 
attend, the chamber was empty save for a matter of seconds, and the body 
as a whole certainly could not participate in making appointments. 
There is, however, the fact that some business was conducted between 
December 17 and January 2.139 On December 23, as noted above, Senator 
Reid obtained unanimous consent from an empty chamber on the payroll 
tax cut140 during an eighty-five-second session.141 Reid’s action, opponents 
claim, interrupted the recess, “clearly undermining any claim that the 
Senate is unavailable to perform its duties during a pro forma session.”142 
Even if one accepts the argument that Reid’s motion for unanimous 
consent constituted Senate business—an arguable claim143—Obama’s recess 
appointments still pass muster. Reid’s motion occurred on December 23, a 
full twelve days before Obama appointed Cordray and the NLRB members, 
two days more than the minimum recess period appointment opponents 
 
135  157 CONG. REC. S8783–84 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011). 
136  See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text. 
137  S. REP. NO. 58-4389, at 2 (1905). 
138  FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE 1084 (Alan S. Frumin 
ed., rev. ed. 1992). 
139  See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 130; Meese & Gaziano, supra note 133. 
140  Senate Pro Forma Session, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.c-spanvideo.
org/program/SenateProFormaSess. 
141  157 CONG. REC. S8789–90 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2011). 
142  158 CONG. REC. S317 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2012) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, reading into the 
record a letter from thirty-four senators questioning the appointments). 
143  The actual business—the agreement to the payroll tax cut extension—had been worked out 
during the previous few days, not on the day in question. Further, Reid’s motion was not the passage of 
legislation; it was consent that future legislation would be considered passed upon its appearance, 
something the Senate was free to undo in the future. See Kasperowicz, supra note 131 (detailing the deal 
between Democrats and Republicans). 
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have said is necessary for a proper recess.144 Going further, as the 
Administration has argued, the recess period during the new session of 
Congress, from January 3 to 23, 2012, constituted a twenty-day recess, 
regardless of pro forma sessions.145 Most of all, it has been standard practice 
since at least 1921 for the President to determine whether a recess is 
occurring,146 as the Senate sends no actual word to the White House that it is 
in recess. Opponents of the appointments have failed to marshal evidence 
that any Senate business occurred between Reid’s December 23 motion and 
the January 4 appointments, or they have otherwise made the unprecedented 
claim that twelve days is not a sufficiently lengthy recess to allow a recess 
appointment. The appointments should stand on their own. 
B. Three Days or Less? 
But even if the pragmatic arguments above were not true, and the 2012 
appointments occurred during what was merely a three-day recess of the 
Senate,147 the appointments remain constitutionally legitimate. While three 
days is shorter than most recesses during which presidents have made 
appointments,148 presidential action to make appointments during a recess of 
that length is not unprecedented. Moreover, the rationale behind the 
argument that a recess must be three days long to validate a recess 
appointment fails under close examination. 
In addition to Theodore Roosevelt’s “constructive recess,” lasting only 
moments,149 President Harry Truman made an appointment during a 
similarly limited window early in his presidency.150 During a three-day 
break between December 31, 1948, and January 3, 1949, Truman re-
appointed Oswald Ryan, a prominent member of the Civil Aeronautics 
Board,151 to his post without the consent of Congress. (The appointment 
stood.)152 
 
144  See Carrie Johnson, Debate over Appointees Hinges On One Word: Recess, NPR (Jan. 7, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/07/144812953/debate-over-appointees-hinges-on-one-word-recess (quoting 
Heritage Foundation official Todd Gaziano: “There have been over 90 years of interpretation in which 
both branches of government have agreed that [a break of] at least nine or 10 days [with no Senate 
business conducted] is necessary . . . .” (alterations in original)). 
145  Lawfulness of Recess Appointments, supra note 16, at 1. 
146  Executive Power—Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 25 (1921) (“[T]he President is 
necessarily vested with a large, although not unlimited, discretion to determine when there is a real and 
genuine recess making it impossible for him to receive the advice and consent of the Senate.”). 
147  The January 3 session ended at 12:02 and 13 seconds PM; the January 6 session began at 11:00 
and 3 seconds AM. 
148  HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21308, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS 10 (2012) (pointing to shortest recess length of at least ten days). 
149  See supra Part I.B.2. 
150  HOGUE, supra note 148, at 10. 
151  William G. Blair, Oswald Ryan, 94, Once Headed C.A.B., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1983, at 24. 
152  HOGUE, supra note 148, at 10. 
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While two episodes do not make a trend, they suggest that there is no 
ironclad constitutional or historical reason a recess must be three days long 
before a president can consider recess appointments. As the only federal 
appellate court to touch this question in recent years has found, the 
Constitution “does not establish a minimum time that an authorized break in 
the Senate must last to give legal force to the President’s appointment 
power under the Recess Appointments Clause.”153 It would be difficult to 
argue from a plain reading of the Constitution’s text, combined with 
historical experience, that Obama’s appointments during a three-day recess 
were either unprecedented or blatantly in violation of the separation of 
powers. 
Opponents of the appointments nonetheless claim constitutional 
support for the idea that a recess appointment can occur only during a 
recess of more than three days. For this idea, they point to the 
Adjournments Clause, requiring either house of Congress to acquire 
consent from the other if its members want to adjourn for over three days.154 
Therefore, they submit, a recess must be three days to be constitutionally 
valid and thus appropriate for recess appointments. The sole authority155 
beyond the op-ed page for this notion rests in the tentative wording of a 
Department of Justice amicus brief from 1993. In Mackie v. Clinton, a 
federal district court heard a claim on an appointment made during a 
thirteen-day recess of the Senate.156 Though the decision turned on other 
matters, the Justice Department filed a twenty-eight page “memorandum of 
points and authorities” in the case that included four paragraphs discussing 
recess lengths.157 
After citing the Adjournments Clause, the brief begins and ends its 
substantive argument on the topic with two sentences: “It might be argued 
that this [constitutional language] means that the Framers did not consider 
one, two and three day recesses to be constitutionally significant. But that 
situation is not presented here because the recess lasted 13 days.”158 This 
assertion is accompanied by no support, historical or otherwise. In addition, 
the brief states, any other argument for the baseline length of a recess in 
reference to the Recess Appointments Clause “would of necessity be 
 
153  Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
154  See, e.g., Meese & Gaziano, supra note 133. 
155  MAEVE P. CAREY & HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41776, PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN INDEPENDENT AND OTHER AGENCIES DURING THE 110TH 
CONGRESS 6 n.25 (2011) (noting that the “three-day norm” cited as justification for pro forma sessions 
“derives from” a brief in the Mackie case). 
156  827 F. Supp. 56, 57 (D.D.C. 1993). 
157  Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 25, Mackie, 827 F. Supp. 56 (No. 93-0032-LFO). 
158  Id. 
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completely arbitrary” because “the Constitution provides no basis for 
limiting the recess to a specific number of days.”159 
The assertion in the memo that three days might have been 
“constitutionally significant” to the Framers is belied by two historical 
facts. First, the initial text of the Adjournments Clause during the 
Constitutional Convention appeared in a draft constitution submitted by 
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina on May 29, 1787.160 Yet that document 
did not specify three days, or any number of days at all: “Neither House, 
without the consent of the other, shall adjourn for more than —— days, nor 
to any place but where they are sitting.”161 It strains credulity to claim that a 
three-day period is somehow a natural fit for the Constitution, as the 
number was initially left indeterminate. 
Second, there is no record of any debate in Madison’s journal of the 
Convention over what number of days to require in the Clause. Its next 
mention at the Convention was more than two months after Pinckney 
introduced his plan, when the “three days” language suddenly appeared in a 
new draft of the Constitution.162 Madison’s journal reveals no debate on the 
Clause between those two dates, and nothing that would shed light on the 
Framers’ choice of three days for the timing of adjournments. Finally, the 
three-day requirement has not proven to be ironclad. In 1916, to pick just 
one example, the Senate adjourned from a Saturday to a Thursday without 
the House’s consent;163 the lapse “was called to the attention of the House 
membership but nothing further was ever done about it.”164 That was not the 
only instance. As Senator Byrd noted in 1977, “precedent” reveals that the 
Senate has often recessed without pro forma sessions, despite not receiving 
the House’s permission: “The Senate has, in the past, gone out from 
Wednesday until Monday without the approval of the other body.”165 
There are few logical or constitutional reasons why the Framers would 
have placed a special importance on the number three. Nor, for that matter, 
is there any constitutional reason why the Recess Appointments Clause be 
considered in light of the Adjournments Clause. Three days is longer than a 
weekend, perhaps, but shorter than a work week, and there is little else but 
conjecture to guide the question. It was not mentioned in the debates of the 
Convention, nor in The Federalist. Even Justice Story, who seemed able to 
articulate the logic behind the entire Constitution, gave no explanation for 
the figure in his Commentaries, despite mentioning the Clause.166 
 
159  Id. at 26. 
160  MADISON, supra note 45, at 64–72 (debate of May 29, 1787). 
161  Id. at 67. 
162  Id. at 452 (debate of Aug. 6, 1787). 
163  53 CONG. REC. 8853 (daily ed. May 29, 1916). 
164  RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 138, at 15. 
165  123 CONG. REC. 33,302 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1977). 
166  2 STORY, supra note 49, § 841, at 303–04. 
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What is more, Article II gives the President a special power to adjourn 
the houses of Congress “in Case of Disagreement between them, with 
Respect to the Time of Adjournment.”167 The Clause mentions no minimum 
time during which the houses must disagree before the President can step 
in. As noted above, no president has ever used this power.168 But its 
inclusion nonetheless suggests that the three-day requirement for 
“constitutionally significant” recesses is far from ironclad. And it further 
justifies the notion that the President does have some right to interact with 
Congress over its adjournment—at the very least when Congress is actually 
at recess but claims not to be. 
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRO FORMA SESSION 
A. Deactivation of an Enumerated Power 
Through use of the pro forma session in recent years, Congress has 
blockaded presidential use of a power enumerated in Article II of the 
Constitution. That article confers upon the President the “Power to fill up 
all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate.”169 Yet 
Congress has used the pro forma session as a vehicle to claim that recesses 
no longer occur, making the Recess Appointments Clause into surplusage. 
However, the Senate is not in session when it sends one senator for a “pro 
forma” meeting of the body. Even if it were, holding these “meetings” once 
every three days does not render the body continuously in session.170 It is in 
recess. By claiming otherwise, the Senate’s arguments risk violating the 
letter of the Constitution and the intent of its Framers. In defying the 
Senate’s interpretation and making his appointments, President Obama 
stood on solid ground. 
It is a simple canon of constitutional interpretation that nothing in the 
Constitution should be construed to be “entirely without meaning.”171 “It 
cannot be presumed that any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be 
without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the 
words require it.”172 Any construction of a provision of the Constitution that 
renders it “mere surplusage, [or] form without substance . . . cannot, 
therefore, be the true construction of the article.”173 And yet, the Recess 
Appointment Clause was destined to remain mere surplusage without the 
appointments of January 2012. Since 2007, first George W. Bush and then 
 
167  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
168  CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 94, at 563. 
169  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
170  See supra Part II.A–B. 
171  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
172  Id. 
173  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 394 (1821) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 
174) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Barack Obama had acquiesced to the Senate’s interpretation, refraining 
from making appointments during recess when pro forma sessions were 
ongoing.174 
Article II, unlike the laundry list of congressional powers in Article I, 
affords the Executive only a few enumerated powers. The section names 
just six separate prerogatives of the President, a list short enough to be 
repeated here: to serve as Commander in Chief; to require opinions from 
the heads of executive departments; to grant reprieves and pardons; to make 
treaties; to make appointments; and to make recess appointments.175 
The power of the President to make appointments is enumerated within 
a single clause of the Constitution, but it is admittedly tempered within that 
same clause by the involvement of the Senate. The extent of the Senate’s 
involvement in the appointments process is articulated in three words: 
“Advice and Consent.”176 Though the meaning of that phrase “is not self-
evident,”177 the understanding among the Framers eventually settled upon 
the notion that “as the President was to nominate, there would be 
responsibility; and as the Senate was to concur, there would be 
security”178—in other words, the definition of shared governance and 
separation of powers. 
Yet there is no such mention of the Senate in the subsequent clause on 
recess appointments. The Framers excluded involvement of senators in 
recess appointments because—and this almost goes without saying—they 
would not be in town when such appointments were needed. Yet today, 
when the Senate holds pro forma sessions, it is also not sitting as a 
deliberative body, despite claiming to be one. Ninety-nine senators have 
gone home to perform vital constituent services.179 One senator stands 
before an empty chamber;180 orders of procedure explicitly command that 
no business is to be conducted.181 The great majority of senators are away, 
 
174  See supra Part I.C.2. 
175  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Curiously, Section Two also enumerates a power of Congress, in that it 
“may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President 
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” Id. cl. 2. For an exploration of that Clause, 
see Hanah Metchis Volokh, Note, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for Federal 
Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2008). 
176  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
177  Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and Consent”: A Historical 
and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 108 (2005). 
178  MADISON, supra note 45, at 681 (quoting Gouverneur Morris) (debate of Sept. 7, 1787). 
179  See infra notes 226–30 and accompanying text. 
180  See, e.g., Lengell, supra note 105 (describing a twenty-two second Senate session with one 
senator where no business was conducted). 
181  See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S1085 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2008) (including multiple statements of Sen. 
Harry Reid that “the Senate [will] meet in pro forma session only with no business conducted” on 
several upcoming days). 
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but through a construction of the word “recess,” they are squelching an 
enumerated power designed to operate when they are in absentia. 
As Chief Justice Roberts observed recently in another context, “The 
Constitution’s express conferral of some powers makes clear that it does not 
grant others.”182 It is a simple point, but the Constitution does not grant the 
Senate the power to block recess appointments by pretending not to be at 
recess. The Bush–Obama-era pro forma sessions allowed Congress to 
nullify an enumerated Article II power of the President and were therefore 
contrary to the Constitution. 
B. The House’s Involvement 
The most recent pro forma sessions of the House aimed squarely at 
recess appointments represented a more blatant affront to the Constitution. 
The House of Representatives is excluded entirely from the Appointments 
Clause and has no role to play in presidential appointments. The Framers of 
the Constitution had sensible reasons for making such an exclusion.183 Yet, 
as of 2011, Republican members of the House, who held the majority, were 
holding pro forma sessions explicitly to block presidential appointments.184 
These actions unconstitutionally usurped the Senate’s appointment power 
and violated the intent of the Framers to leave the House out of 
appointments. 
By themselves, the House’s pro forma sessions—when used for 
procedural reasons only—represent valid practice.185 But in 2011, House 
members held pro forma sessions with the explicit and exclusive intent to 
obstruct presidential nominations. As eighty House members wrote to their 
leadership in 2011, “[t]he next logical step in our efforts to restore the 
public’s trust in their government is to prevent further recess appointments” 
and ensure that “the House of Representatives will meet no less than once 
every three days for the remainder of 2011 and all of 2012.”186 Several 
 
182  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). Writing for the majority, 
Chief Justice Roberts also pointed out that “[l]egislative novelty is not necessarily fatal; there is a first 
time for everything. But sometimes ‘the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional 
problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent’ for Congress’s action.” Id. at 2586 (second and third 
alterations in original) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 
3138, 3159 (2010)). As noted earlier, the pro forma sessions under discussion represented the first 
instance where Congress actually attempted to nullify the recess appointment power. See supra note 
104. 
183  See infra notes 188–98 and accompanying text. 
184  See supra Part I.B. Recess appointments or no, they were still appointments. 
185  See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
186  Letter from Eighty Members of the House of Representatives to John Boehner, Eric Cantor, and 
Kevin McCarthy, U.S. House Representatives (June 15, 2011), http://landry.house.gov/sites/landry.
house.gov/files/documents/Freshmen Recess Appointment Letter.pdf. 
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House members, with the consent of their majority leaders, acted on that 
proposal.187 
This House involvement in appointments would likely have come as 
something of a surprise to the Framers. When Hamilton addressed a 
potential “scheme” to include the House of Representatives along with the 
Senate in the “business of appointments,”188 he did not dismiss it out of 
hand, but he came close: 
A body so fluctuating, and at the same time so numerous, can never be deemed 
proper for the exercise of that power. Its unfitness will appear manifest to all, 
when it is recollected that in half a century it may consist of three or four 
hundred persons. All the advantages of the stability, both of the executive and 
of the senate, would be defeated by this union; and infinite delays and 
embarrassments would be occasioned.189 
While debate over the Constitution produced several different 
proposals for the appointments process, including sole Senate authority for 
appointing Supreme Court Justices and ambassadors,190 the House did not 
feature in the negotiations. The first proposal for the appointment of judges 
assigned the task to the “National Legislature,”191 but James Wilson and 
others feared that the “impropriety of such appointments by numerous 
bodies” necessarily included “[i]ntrigue, partiality, and concealment.”192 In 
response, the Framers struck a compromise representing the shared power 
that landed the nomination power with the Executive.193 
Concerns about the size of the House came at a time when it had just 
sixty-five members to the Senate’s twenty-six,194 half the proportional 
advantage the House holds today. While Hamilton’s fear of “pervasive 
politicization and instability” through involving the House in 
appointments195 has also more or less infected the modern Senate, the 
original design of unelected senators was implemented to avoid such 
problems. The Framers wanted “persons of more experience, weight of 
 
187  See Jordy Yager, Meet the Eight Freshmen Keeping Congress in Session This Summer, THE 
HILL (Aug. 6, 2011, 2:07 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/175767-meet-the-eight-freshman-
keeping-congress-in-session (describing pro forma sessions initiated by House members). 
188  THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 51, at 515, 519 (Alexander Hamilton). 
189  Id. at 519. 
190  MADISON, supra note 45, at 455 (reprinting a draft of the Constitution produced by the 
Committee of Detail, with Senate appointment powers contained in § 1 of “Article IX”). 
191  Id. at 108 (debate of June 5, 1787). 
192  Id. 
193  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 131 (1976) (per curiam) (“It would seem a fair surmise that a 
compromise had been made.”). 
194  White, supra note 177, at 129. 
195  David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
1033, 1059 (2008) (reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT 
COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES (2006), and JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007)). 
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character, and talents, than the members of the House.”196 The appointments 
process remains entrusted to the Executive and the Senate, “the two elective 
branches of the federal government least susceptible to majoritarian 
pressures.”197 In the House, the bar to gaining office is lower,198 terms are 
shorter, and its members are thus more vulnerable to ouster than those in 
the Senate and Executive Branch. While there have been inventive 
proposals199 for involving the House in advice and consent, such proposals 
would nonetheless likely require a constitutional amendment,200 which at 
this point does not appear to be forthcoming. 
But these points do not require exhaustive analysis here. Whether 
implemented for valid reasons or not, the Appointments Clause excludes 
the House.201 Because the recess appointment power “is to be considered as 
supplementary to the one which precedes,”202 i.e., the appointment power, 
there is no question that it, too, excludes the House. In holding pro forma 
sessions to block recess appointments, House members did not incur 
punishment or court challenges, but perhaps they should have. They plainly 
inserted the House of Representatives into the appointments process—
lending President Obama’s 2012 recess appointments during pro forma 
sessions even more constitutional credibility. 
C. The Recess as Constitutional Assumption 
As a final matter, it is worthwhile to note that recesses of Congress are 
referenced in the United States Constitution but not created by it. Unlike 
specifically promulgated notions such as the compensation203 and the 
required number of annual meetings204 of Congress, the recess of Congress 
 
196  2 STORY, supra note 49, § 1516, at 344. 
197  Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 1060 (2007). 
198  For example, senators still hold office for six years, and a senator is responsible to a broader 
range of interests in that she must gain the vote of her entire state rather than any individual district. And 
while a successful candidacy for a House seat requires raising a large amount of money from a smaller 
number of donors, a successful Senate candidacy requires raising a tremendous amount of money from a 
staggering number of donors. See, e.g., Ohio: Congressional Races in 2010, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://
www.opensecrets.org/races/election.php?state=OH&cycle=2010 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
199  See, e.g., Richard D. Manoloff, The Advice and Consent of the Congress: Toward a Supreme 
Court Appointment Process for Our Time, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1105 (1993) (urging inclusion of the 
House in confirming Supreme Court Justices). 
200  Id. at 1106–07 (discussing the need for amendment and suggesting possible language). 
201  It does not, for example, refer to the “recess of the House.” See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 3. 
202  THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 51, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton). 
203  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation 
for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.”). 
204  Id. § 4, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall 
be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.”). 
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is only mentioned once in passing: in reference to the grant of authority to 
the President in the Recess Appointments Clause.205 
As this section will explain, the inclusion of the recess in the 
Constitution resulted from a simple assumption of the Framers: that 
recesses were a necessary component of legislative procedure. They 
included an appointment power based on the presence of recesses because 
they assumed legislative recesses would always exist, as they had for 
millennia. Yet through its targeted pro forma sessions, Congress attempted 
to eliminate the recess. That attempt defied an original procedural 
assumption of the Framers—that recesses will exist—which arguably 
underlies the Constitution and should not be contravened. Further, 
Congress’s attempt to eliminate the recess is proven illegitimate by the fact 
that recesses still occur during pro forma sessions in everything but name. 
There are several oblique references to procedural mechanisms and 
entities in the Constitution that the document does not explicitly call for. 
One example is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who is required to 
preside over the impeachment trial of the President.206 That is the sole 
mention of the office of Chief Justice in the document; the office is never 
explicitly created,207 and provisions for salary and tenure of federal judges 
in Article III otherwise make no “special reference to the chief.”208 
Likewise, other institutions and procedures are mentioned in passing as 
though their existence was assumed at the Framing, such as the Treasury,209 
state legislatures,210 orders and resolutions of Congress,211 and militias.212 
The Framers’ assumptions about procedural mechanisms such as recesses 
are distinct from the Framers’ possible substantive assumptions about rights 
 
205  Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen 
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next 
Session.”). 
206  Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall 
preside . . . .”). 
207  The role was established by statute in the 1789 Judiciary Act. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 
1 Stat. 73, 73. 
208  JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 41 (2011). 
209  E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“The Senators and Representatives shall receive a 
Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United 
States.”). 
210  E.g., id. § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”). 
211  E.g., id. § 7, cl. 3 (“Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate 
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be 
presented to the President of the United States . . . .”). 
212  E.g., id. § 8, cl. 15 (“To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, 
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions . . . .”). 
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and privileges, which are less certain and arguably not binding.213 Instead, 
these assumptions refer to things that in large part already existed or were 
part of the common practice of the time.214 Such procedures should be 
governed strictly by the Framers’ assumptions; they represent the Framers’ 
critical thoughts about how government should be structured and therefore 
must be maintained. 
Admittedly, the recess appointment power is a conditional grant of 
authority to the President. The power is active only “during the Recess of 
the Senate.”215 But the Framers assumed the condition necessary for 
exercise of that power would exist; many of them had taken recesses 
themselves as legislators under the Articles of Confederation.216 They were 
also no doubt aware of the historical procedural practices of legislatures that 
served as their models, which took recesses as a matter of course.217 Just as 
important, the state legislatures from which many of the Framers arose also 
regularly took recesses,218 an experience that helped inspire Jefferson’s idea 
for a Committee of the States to act during congressional intermissions.219 
Both Parliament and the Congress of the Confederation had assigned 
powers away for the inevitable consequence that recesses would occur.220 
The recess appointment power in Article II was no different, and the 
Framers no doubt assumed it would always be accessible, just as they 
assumed recesses would always take place. 
One response to this argument is that simply because the Framers 
assumed the existence of recesses does not mean they must still occur. And 
it is certainly true that the recess of the Senate is no longer strictly 
 
213  See Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 616 (2009) (discussing the range of possible substantive assumptions of the 
Framers and criticizing the treatment of such assumptions as binding, as in contract law). 
214  As demonstrated in Part I.A, the recess was assuredly a longstanding legislative practice from 
the Roman Senate through Parliament, and its similar structural equivalents in the Constitution also have 
long histories. The tradition of appointing a chief justice is also ancient, having been brought to England 
by William the Conqueror from Normandy, “where it had long existed.” 1 LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES 
OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 1 (Jersey City, Fred. D. Linn & Co. 1881). The Articles of 
Confederation created the national treasury, which provided that American war debt “be defrayed out of 
a common treasury.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VIII. The militia assuredly existed 
throughout the colonies prior to the 1787 Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., MUSTER ROLLS OF THE 
NAVY AND LINE, MILITIA AND RANGERS, 1775–1783, at 399–809 (William Henry Egle ed., Pa., Wm. 
Stanley Ray 1898). 
215  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
216  See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. 
217  See supra Part I.A (describing practices of the Roman Senate and the English Parliament to 
regularly take recesses). 
218  See supra Part I.A. 
219  See JEFFERSON, supra note 41, at 53 (“The remissness of Congress, and their permanent session, 
began to be a subject of uneasiness; and even some of the legislatures had recommended to them 
intermissions, and periodical sessions.”). 
220  See supra notes 35–37, 39–43 and accompanying text. 
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necessary. Senators are among the most frequent fliers221 and train 
passengers222 in our country; barring incompetency in our common carriers, 
enough of them can make it to Washington to perform Senate business at 
any given time. Yet the Framers’ recognition that Senate recesses were 
necessary—that the body could not be “continually in session”223—was as 
valid then as it is today. Even with modern pro forma sessions, during 
which the Senate is “active,” senators still perform the same traditional 
recess activities that their predecessors did. In other words, they are at 
recess, but calling it something else. 
During the Senate’s 2011–2012 winter break, for example, which 
lasted from December 17224 to January 23,225 its members were busy outside 
Washington. They went on diplomatic missions,226 toured businesses in 
their home states,227 spoke to local Boys and Girls Clubs,228 and met with 
their constituents229—an exchange one of them deemed “so important to the 
process of representative government.”230 These senators would likely be 
the first to admit that such activities are necessary to their effectiveness as 
representatives. Yet they are the same senators who claimed their chamber 
was fully active during pro forma sessions. Without recesses, senators could 
not exit Washington en masse to perform vital constituent services. 
 
221  See, e.g., Rhonda Schwartz, Reid, Lott Top Senate List of Corporate Frequent Fliers, ABCNEWS 
(Jan. 8, 2007, 5:23 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2007/01/reid_lott_top_s. 
222  See, e.g., Mark Leibovich, Riding the Rails with Amtrak Joe, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS (Sept. 16, 
2008, 5:51 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/riding-the-rails-with-amtrak-joe 
(detailing the train-based exploits of then-Senator Joe Biden, an Amtrak aficionado). 
223  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
224  157 CONG. REC. S8783–84 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011) (unanimous consent given to Senator Ron 
Wyden’s request that “when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn and convene for pro 
forma sessions only, with no business conducted on the following dates and times”). 
225  158 CONG. REC. S13 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2012) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid: “I, first of all, 
welcome everyone back after the long break we had. I hope it was restful and productive for 
everyone.”). 
226  Press Release, Office of Sen. Mitch McConnell, McConnell to Visit Burma (Jan. 12, 2012), 
available at http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases (browse by month and 
year to January 2012; then select Jan. 12, 2012 press release). 
227  Press Release, Office of Sen. Marco Rubio, Senator Marco Rubio to Visit Orlando Wednesday 
(Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news?p=Press-Releases 
(browse by month and year to January 2012; then select Jan. 10, 2012 press release). 
228  Wyoming Image, FIRSTPOST, http://im.firstpost.com/topic/place/wyoming-in-this-photo-taken-
tuesday-aug-7-2012-sen-jo-image-02MFcWue0s4fH-421-1.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (showing 
Wyoming Senator John Barrasso speaking during an awards ceremony on August 7, 2012, for the Boys 
and Girls Clubs of Central Wyoming). 
229  Senator Blunt Participates in Economic Roundtables Across Mid-Mo 1/3/2012 & 1/4/2012, 
OFFICE OF SEN. ROY BLUNT, http://blunt.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/senator-blunt-participates-in-
economic-roundtables-across-mid-mo (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
230  Press Release, Office of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Begins 2012 Meetings with Iowans in 
36 Counties (Jan. 5, 2012), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_
dataPageID_1502=38446. 
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As it stands, senatorial opponents of pro forma session recess 
appointments have tried to have it both ways. They pretended recesses were 
not occurring despite traveling home for recess duties, yet still tried to 
scuttle an enumerated recess power the Framers assumed would always be 
available. In the process, they defied a constitutional assumption of the 
Framers, who wrote the practice of recess appointments into the 
Constitution itself based on history, logic, and good sense. 
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS 
The appointments process and the recess appointments process have 
changed drastically since the time of the Framers. As originally conceived, 
the interplay of advice and consent with presidential nominations was 
uncontroversial. From 1789 until 1961, for example, the Senate rejected 
only eight presidential nominees to cabinet positions,231 reflecting the “usual 
custom of the Senate”232 not to interfere with the President’s choices for 
who would lead departments of the Executive Branch. Yet with the passage 
of time, the ever-increasing use of “dilatory tactics” in the Senate has 
produced “a highly politicized process of confirming executive branch 
nominations.”233 This is not a new story. President Obama’s complaint in 
2010, for example, about the Senate’s “unprecedented obstruction”234 of his 
nominees was itself hardly unprecedented.235 
As the appointments process has evolved, so has the recess 
appointment power. The recess appointment today is just as exemplary of 
partisan conflict as the normal appointments process.236 The original reasons 
behind such a power—much shorter sessions of Congress and the realities 
of eighteenth century travel—no longer apply. Yet both appointment 
provisions have evolved to complement each other as a new form of checks 
and balances. Through the use of such “dilatory” measures, the Senate has 
achieved a nearly unfettered ability to frustrate typical nominations, and the 
recess appointment power has likewise evolved to allow the Executive the 
ability to combat such obstruction. 
 
231  See James, supra note 67. 
232  Id. at 261. 
233  Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch 
Nominations 1885–1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1141 (1999). 
234  Letter from President Barack Obama to Senators Harry Reid, Mitch McConnell, Patrick Leahy, 
& Jeff Sessions 1 (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.politico.com/static/PPM153_cc_093010.
html. 
235  See, e.g., Brian Naylor, Bipartisan Group Pursuing Compromise on Filibuster, NPR (May 20, 
2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4659790 (quoting Sen. Mitch McConnell 
on the Democrats’ “unprecedented obstruction” of President Bush’s nominees). 
236  See, e.g., Jennifer Rubin, So Much for Bipartisanship—A Slew of Recess Appointments, WASH. 
POST RIGHT TURN (Dec. 30, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/right-turn/2010/12/so_
much_for_bipartisanship_--.html (quoting a senior advisor to a “key Republican senator” calling 
Obama’s recess appointments “an outrage” amid partisan rancor over nominees). 
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However, when the Senate denies the President the recess appointment 
power through its use of pro forma sessions, it upsets this balance. Senate 
success at derailing nominations, including recess nominations, is not only 
damaging, it is self-defeating. The reason is clear: Senate obstruction often 
fails to block the nominees it targets. Were the recess appointment power 
instead allowed to function,237 it could resume its important role as both a 
check and a balance in the appointment of government officers. 
A. The Problem of Unfilled Offices 
Congressional obstruction of presidential appointments has costs that 
are practical as well as constitutional. In general, over the past several 
administrations, vacancies have caused “agency inaction, confusion among 
nonpolitical workers, and decreased agency accountability.”238 The 
predicament may be most acute in the judiciary, where vacancies are 
pushing the system toward a “crisis point” of too many cases and too few 
judges.239 In 2011, 101 of the nation’s 857 federal judgeships (excluding the 
Supreme Court) were empty, with the Administrative Office of the Courts 
calling 46 of those vacancies “judicial emergenc[ies]” where judges cannot 
keep up with caseloads.240 
The problem is directly linked to the Senate’s obstruction of 
presidential nominees. In his annual report on the federal judiciary in 2010, 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that “[e]ach political party has found it easy to 
turn on a dime from decrying to defending the blocking of judicial 
nominations, depending on their changing political fortunes. This has 
created acute difficulties for some judicial districts. Sitting judges in those 
districts have been burdened with extraordinary caseloads.”241 The crisis has 
grown to the point where the Justice Department estimates that by 2020, 
half of all judgeships will be unfilled if the current pattern continues.242 
Litigants will wait even longer for their day in federal court, and those with 
exclusively federal claims, such as those in the ever-booming patent 
 
237  And as it has been conceded to (at least until recently) by the “unbroken acquiescence of the 
Senate.” President’s Appointing Power, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 356 (1862). 
238  Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 913, 937–38 (2009). 
239  Jerry Markon & Shailagh Murray, Vacancies on Federal Bench Hit Crisis Point, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 8, 2011, at A1. Circuit courts have held that presidents can appoint Article III judges through recess 
appointments, though the Supreme Court has not reached the topic. See, e.g., Evans v. Stephens, 387 
F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985) (en 
banc); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962). 
240  Markon & Murray, supra note 239. 
241  JOHN ROBERTS, U.S. SUPREME COURT, 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
7–8 (Dec. 31, 2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2010year-
endreport.pdf. 
242  Eric H. Holder Jr., Op-Ed., A Crisis in Our Courts, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2010, at A25. 
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litigation market,243 will be the most affected because they have no choice 
but federal court from the outset. The potential impact of this situation is 
ominous. As Justice Kennedy has noted, “If judicial excellence is cast upon 
a sea of congressional indifference, the rule of law is imperiled.”244 
The dilemma is far from limited to the judiciary appointments. For 
example, the Senate’s decision in 2007 to block all recess appointments 
with pro forma sessions produced governmental difficulties and had “far-
reaching policy consequences.”245 Among these consequences was the 
inability of the Federal Elections Commission to make major campaign 
finance decisions a year before heated midterm elections; another was the 
discrediting of the National Labor Relations Board,246 which was operating 
with two of five members, a situation the Supreme Court later held to be 
unacceptable.247 The current Administration’s decision to alter this balance 
and restore the President’s ability to make these entities functional was not 
only constitutional, but a step in the right direction for the effective 
functioning of American government. 
B. The Problem of Acting Heads 
Not all offices, however, have remained unfilled during the era of pro 
forma obstruction. While members of Congress may believe they are 
preventing the appointment of individuals who will make unwelcome 
policy choices, refusing a recess appointment often does not freeze an 
agency or prevent it from acting. On the contrary, many agencies continue 
to operate under the direction of a person Congress has never confirmed: 
the acting head, or the person who fills the office before the Senate 
approves the official head. 
Federal law permits the President to appoint an individual “to perform 
the functions and duties of [a] vacant [federal] office temporarily in an 
acting capacity.”248 In allowing this power, Congress “wanted to diminish 
the length of vacancies by temporarily filling such offices with subordinates 
while the President nominated a permanent replacement to the Senate.”249 
Congress provided for such vacancies through the Vacancies Act of 1868 
 
243  See, e.g., Nicholas W. Stephens, Note, From Forest Group to the America Invents Act: False 
Patent Marking Comes Full Circle, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1003, 1005 (2012) (“The past two decades have 
seen a steady growth in the volume of high-stakes patent litigation.”); James Bessen & Michael J. 
Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 05-
18, 2005), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/lit.pdf. 
244  Carol J. Williams, Political Logjam on Federal Judgeships, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2010, at A7. 
245  Ryan C. Black et al., Assessing Congressional Responses to Growing Presidential Powers: The 
Case of Recess Appointments, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 570, 571 (2011). 
246  Id. 
247  See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2638 (2010). 
248  5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2) (2006). 
249  Patrick Hein, Comment, In Defense of Broad Recess Appointment Power: The Effectiveness of 
Political Counterweights, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 235, 274 (2008). 
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and subsequent amendments; the most recent version allows for acting 
heads to remain in office for up to 210 days.250 Therefore, while Congress 
regularly held pro forma sessions to block recess appointments since 2007, 
it was doing nothing to prevent the accession of acting heads who 
proceeded to make policy decisions without any congressional oversight 
whatsoever. 
A particularly acute example is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF). While President Obama’s 2010 nominee 
for ATF director has been waiting over two years251 for Senate confirmation 
at this writing, presidents have appointed multiple acting directors to head 
the $1 billion, 2,500-agent agency,252 all without any Senate input. In fact, 
ATF has been without a confirmed director since Senate confirmation was 
first required253 for the agency in 2006, with five acting directors since 
then.254 These acting heads have not hesitated to make policy255 and 
personnel choices256 since that time, despite the lack of any Senate-
confirmed director. Some of these policy choices, such as the notorious Fast 
and Furious program which inadvertently put guns in the hands of drug 
cartels, have sparked controversy.257 Consequently, it might be argued that 
policymaking at ATF has been removed from the advice and consent 
regime altogether, despite the law requiring the Senate to confirm the 
agency’s directors. 
Other offices serving important roles in government have also been 
home to acting heads. For example, the Obama Administration’s 
 
250  § 3346(a)(1). 
251  See Frank Main, ATF Boss Unfazed by Firearm Probe, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011, 10:32 
AM), http://www.suntimes.com/photos/galleries/8428277-417/atf-boss-unfazed-by-firearm-probe.html 
(noting that Andrew Traver was still awaiting Senate confirmation); Press Release, The White House, 
President Obama Announces More Key Administration Posts (Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/15/president-obama-announces-more-key-administration-posts 
(announcing nomination of Andrew Traver for ATF head). 
252  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Firearms Bureau Finds Itself in a Rough Patch, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 
2011, at A14 (quoting ATF agent about multiple acting heads: “We’ll never get a director confirmed, 
even if it was the pope.”). 
253  28 U.S.C. § 599A (2006) (requiring ATF director “be appointed by the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate”). 
254  Kevin Johnson, New Chief Enters Fray as ATF Faces 2 Federal Probes, USA TODAY, Sept. 1, 
2011, at 5A. 
255  See Main, supra note 251 (describing ATF acting director discussing his agency’s “crackdown” 
on weapons trafficking to Mexico). 
256  See Press Release, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Acting Director 
Jones Announces New Staff Assignments (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.atf.gov/press/releases/
2011/10/100511-atf-atf-acting-director-jones-announces-new-staff-assignments.html (describing the 
orders of new acting head to make numerous personnel changes at the agency). 
257  See Charlie Savage, Justice Inquiry Faults Its Own in Guns Fiasco, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, 
at A1 (late edition) (describing the Inspector General’s “scathing critique” of the guns program); see 
also Richard A. Serrano, ATF Gun Debacle Costs Leader His Job, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2011, at A1 
(detailing the downfall of temporary ATF head Kenneth E. Melson). 
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Comptroller of the Currency, a Treasury Department office whose charge is 
to “charter, regulate, and supervise all national banks and federal savings 
associations,”258 was home to an acting head for nearly two years.259 This 
unconfirmed director had an indisputable effect on policy after taking 
office; Senate Democrats demanded his removal for “obstructing key 
aspects” of the Administration’s financial overhaul plan.260 Senators’ 
holding out on recess appointments did not change the fact that officers 
unaccountable to the Senate were running those agencies. 
Moreover, in several instances the acting head of an agency was the 
very same person whose recess appointment Congress was attempting to 
prevent—rendering the use of the pro forma session to block that 
appointment all the more fruitless. For example, the Obama Administration 
in June 2011 nominated Martin J. Gruenberg to serve as chairman for the 
Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).261 
But despite the fact that the Senate had not yet confirmed his appointment 
as of November 2011, Gruenberg had been serving since his nomination as 
acting chairman.262 At the National Labor Relations Board, already a 
contentious battleground in this area after Obama’s January 2012 recess 
appointments to its board,263 the President’s current nominee for general 
counsel264 and the current acting general counsel265 are one and the same. 
These acting heads implement policy just as an officially confirmed 
officeholder would, especially if the nominee and the acting head are the 
same person. Were the House and Senate to allow recess appointments of 
 
258  About the OCC, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/
mission/index-about.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
259  John G. Walsh: Acting Comptroller of the Currency, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, http://
www.occ.treas.gov/about/who-we-are/comptroller-of-the-currency/bio-john-walsh.html (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2012). 
260  Binyamin Appelbaum, Official from F.D.I.C. Picked to Lead Banking Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 2, 2011, at B3. 
261  Press Release, The White House, Nominations Sent to the Senate, 6/13/2011 (June 13, 2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/13/nominations-sent-senate-6132011 
(including the name of Gruenberg for an FDIC position). 
262  Chris Isidore, ‘Too Big to Fail’ Foe Picked for Top FDIC Post, CNNMONEY (Oct. 21, 2011, 
12:53 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/21/news/economy/banks_hoenig/index.htm (reporting that 
Gruenberg was serving as vice chairman and acting chairman since his nomination). 
263  See Steven Greenhouse, Deadlock Is Ending on Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, at B1 
(reporting tension over recess appointments to the NLRB “after 26 months of near paralysis”). 
264  Press Release, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., President Obama Nominates Lafe Solomon to Be 
General Counsel, Terence F. Flynn to Be Member of the National Labor Relations Board (Jan. 5, 2011), 
available at https://www.nlrb.gov/news/president-obama-nominates-lafe-solomon-be-general-counsel-
terence-f-flynn-be-member-national-la. 
265  The General Counsel, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/general-
counsel (last visited Nov. 29, 2012) (describing Lafe Solomon as acting general counsel since June 21, 
2010). 
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these individuals, as it may have done with Obama’s 2012 appointees,266 the 
effect would be the same. In such an event, the constitutional problem of 
such sessions could be avoided, and the recess appointments would expire 
“at the End of their next Session,”267 allowing the Senate a new chance to 
evaluate a new nominee. 
CONCLUSION 
Although members of the House and Senate purported to honor the 
Constitution by blocking presidential recess appointments with pro forma 
sessions for years, this Comment contends that they were instead violating 
it. Despite congressional backlash against President Obama’s decision in 
early 2012 to break the logjam these sessions created, an analysis of the 
timing of the appointments indicates that the President was on solid policy 
and constitutional ground. Further, even if the timing of Obama’s 
appointments was questionable, the pro forma sessions that otherwise 
restrained him from acting to fill vital offices did not reflect sound 
constitutional policy. Not only did the sessions effectively erase an 
enumerated executive power from Article II, they did so in a way that 
perpetuated an unsafe glut of unfilled government offices. When courts take 
up the question of whether the 2012 appointments were appropriate, they 
should take care to recognize that the recess appointment remains a vital 
part of the hamstrung advice and consent process. It should be left in place 
as an effective but limited tool of government. 
 
266  See Pete Kasperowicz, After a Long Year, Congress Grants Itself an Actual Recess, THE HILL 
FLOOR ACTION BLOG (Mar. 30, 2012, 4:50 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/219325-
after-a-long-year-congress-grants-itself-an-actual-recess (describing a deal between Republicans and 
Obama to forego recess appointments during the 2012 Easter break). By summer, however, pro forma 
sessions had started back up again—albeit down the street in a Senate office building. See Al Kamen, 
Senate ‘Pro Formas’ to Be Held Down the Street, WASH. POST, IN THE LOOP (Aug. 7, 2012, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/post/senate-pro-formas-to-be-held-down-the-street/
2012/08/06/5429948e-dfe2-11e1-8fc5-a7dcf1fc161d_blog.html. No doubt the saga will continue. 
267  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
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